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Abstract: Compression is a fundamental goal of both human language and digital communication, yet natural
language is very different from compression schemes employed by modern computers. We partly explain this
difference using the fact that information theory generally assumes a common prior probability distribution
shared by the encoder and decoder, whereas human communication has to be robust to the fact that a speaker and
listener may have different prior beliefs about what a speaker may say. We model this information-theoretically
using the following question: what type of compression scheme would be effective when the encoder and decoder
have (boundedly) different prior probability distributions. The resulting compression scheme resembles natural
language to a far greater extent than existing digital communication protocols. We also use information theory
to justify why ambiguity is necessary for the purpose of compression.
Keywords: compression, information theory, linguistics.
1 Introduction
It is well-known that information theory sheds light
on natural language in the following sense. Common
words, such as “as” and “and” tend to be shorter than
less frequent words such as “biomimicry.” In this pa-
per, we aim to strengthen the connection between in-
formation theory and the study of human communi-
cation. First, we point out that information theory
justifies ambiguity, pervasive in natural language, by
showing that it is necessary for efficient compression.
Second, we design a compression scheme that bears a
resemblance to natural language, to an extent well be-
yond that of existing compression and error-correcting
schemes. Unlike standard compression schemes, it is
robust to variations in the prior probability distribu-
tion between sender and receiver.
Natural language is ambiguous. One sentence could
mean a variety of things in different contexts. At first
thought, it is not clear that ambiguity serves any pur-
pose, and communication may seem best when every-
thing has the precision of mathematics with (ideally)
exactly one interpretation. On such grounds, Wa-
sow et al. (2005) call the existence of ambiguity in lan-
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guage surprising, and moreover, note that the relative
lack of work or interest in the ambiguity of language
by linguists is also surprising. Cohen (2006) discusses
the various theories proposed for why language is am-
biguous, but he concludes, “As far as I can see, the
reason for the ambiguity of language remains a puzzle
we simply don’t know why language is ambiguous.”
According to Chomsky (2008), ambiguity illustrates
that natural language was “poorly designed for com-
municative efficiency.”
speculates that the primary purpose of ambiguity
in language is not for succinct communication but for,
“minimizing the complexity of rule systems.”
However, it is easy to justify ambiguity to anyone
who is familiar with information theory. Typical sen-
tences, such as, Alice said that Bob lied to Eve, are
ambiguous but shorter than clearer alternatives.1 In
context, the intended meaning is often clear, and hence
shorter communication is preferred. This is exactly
what information theory predicts – optimal compres-
sion is possible when there is a known prior probabil-
ity distribution, p, over what is to be communicated.
The common prior shared by a pair of communicating
1The sentence Alice said, “Bob lied to Eve” implies a direct
quotation and therefore has a different meaning than the in-
tended, Alice said something to someone, and that something
was that Bob lied to Eve.
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parties may be viewed as the shared context between
them. The following manner of communicating would
be essentially optimal in terms of minimizing expected
communication length. For any natural number, n, a
speaker who had in mind a certain thought would say
n and mean the nth most likely thought according to
our shared prior distribution.
Two problems with the above compression scheme
stand out. First, it is very brittle in the sense that
if the speaker and listener have even slightly differ-
ent priors, every transmission may be completely er-
roneous. (This is true of Huffman coding as well.)
Second, it clearly does not resemble human communi-
cation of any form. We show that these two problems
are related by giving a compression scheme which is
(a) robust to differences in priors, and (b) resembles
human language.
1.1 The scheme and similarity to
human disambiguation
We consider one-way (non-interactive) communica-
tion, in which there is a set of messages, represent-
ing what the sender would like to communicate (an
idea, the true intended meaning of the communica-
tion). There is also a set of encodings, which rep-
resent the actual communication. For simplicity, we
may think of the encoding as a single written sentence,
but it could equally be an email, an elaborate hand
gesture, or an utterance of arbitrary length. Some
encodings are longer than others, and it is desirable
to (a) ensure that the receivers recover the intended
message, and (b) minimize the encoding length.
The sender has a prior probability distribution, p
over messages. This prior distribution is determined
by the context in which the discussion takes place,
and to some extent the speaker’s knowledge and all
of her own experiences. The sender also chooses a
parameter α ≥ 1 reflecting how broad an audience to
whom her communication must be clear. For example,
if the sender is writing a paper for people within her
community, she would choose a smaller α then if she
were writing for an interdisciplinary audience. The
receiver has a potentially different prior distribution,
q. The communication will be clear as long as q is
within an α factor of p, i.e., 1αp(m) ≤ q(m) ≤ αp(m)
for all messages m.
Figure 1 depicts an underlying a bipartite graph
between messages and encodings. This graph can be
viewed as a dictionary: for each encoding it specifies
a set of possible messages (meanings). It is assumed
that this underlying graph (we postpone describing
how it is chosen) is commonly known to both people
and serves roughly the same purpose as a language.
The receiver’s decoding procedure is natural: given
a received encoding, he chooses the most likely com-
patible message according to his distribution, i.e., the
message most likely under q which has an edge to the
received encoding. The sender, assuming that q is
within a factor of α of p, chooses a minimal-length
encoding that will guarantee correct decoding for all
such q. This amounts to being the shortest encoding
where the intended message has a significantly higher
(α2 factor) probability than any another possible in-
terpretation.
Figure 1: In our compression schemes, there is a common-
knowledge “dictionary,” a bipartite graph connecting en-
codings to possible messages. The messages, on the left
side, are the possible ideas that the sender may wish to
convey. The right side has each possible encoding, e.g.,
written sentences, longer units of text, or any other form
of communication across a medium. Each person has a pri-
vate prior distribution over messages. The bipartite graph
has an edge between an encoding and each meaning that
it might plausibly represent. In our scheme, the decoder
simply chooses the most likely message that is adjacent to
the transmitted encoding, according to the receivers prior.
The sender chooses the shortest encoding which is guar-
anteed to be correctly decoded.
The bipartite graph (i.e., dictionary) is chosen based
upon some parameters. We give two instantiations.
The first is simpler but has infinitely many parame-
ters. The second is based upon universal hash func-
tions and has parameters that require a number of
bits which is logarithmic in the number of messages.
This mirrors the Principles and Parameters Theory
of linguistics (see, e.g., Chomsky and Lansik, 1993),
which states that a small number of parameters char-
acterize each language. In natural language, it would
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be infeasible to print a “sentence dictionary” of what
every sentence or document might mean in any con-
text. However, such a mapping is, to some extent,
implicitly computable in people’s mind. People would
largely agree that the sentence Alice said that Bob lied
to Eve could mean that Alice said that (Bob lied to
Eve) or that Alice told Eve that Bob lied. Of course,
there will never be perfect agreement on the complete
set of possibilities, just as different dictionaries do not
agree on definitions or even the set of legal words.
In this example, some may argue that, in the above,
Alice might be indicating that Bob was lying (on a
bed, perhaps), and avoided the grammatically correct
version: Alice said that Bob lay to Eve. While there
will always be gray areas and exceptions to most lin-
guistic rules, to a first approximation this dictionary
model of language is more faithful than either of the
two extremes: each sentence has exactly one inter-
pretation (like an ideal computer programming lan-
guage), or any sentence can mean anything in the right
context (as in compression schemes such as Huffman
coding).
We feel that this procedure also resembles human
language both in terms of listening and speaking, or
at least to a greater extent than existing compres-
sion schemes. In terms of disambiguation, it seems
natural for a listener to take the most likely plausi-
ble interpretation in the “dictionary,” under his prior
over what he expects the speaker to mean. Conversely,
it is the speaker’s duty to communicate in such a
manner that any listener in her audience will believe
that the intended message is the most likely interpre-
tation of what is said. And of course it is ambigu-
ous – a certain encoding may be decoded differently
depending on the decoder’s prior (context). Fur-
thermore, these properties arise naturally out of a
mathematical goal of provable efficiency in encoding
length.
Finally, we also mention a technique whereby one
can reduce the dictionary size. This pruning step only
leads to a slight improvement in efficiency. However
it also resembles an effect that occurs in language. It
takes advantage of the fact that a speaker would not
normally use an unnecessarily complicated expression
for a simple idea that could be described in a shorter






f(x) .= log x/x
Here, mathematically sophisticated readers will nat-
urally interpret log 1/p(x) as meaning log(1/p(x))
rather than log(1)/p(x) = 0. On the other hand, the
log x/x will be log(x)/x rather than log(x/x) = 0. In
both cases, the listener is performing higher-order rea-
soning. In particular, the listener would have expected
a simpler, unambiguous definition, like f(x) .= 0, if the
intended meaning were 0. While the savings in com-
munication is modest, such short-cuts are regularly
used by mathematicians, who generally have a strong
desire to avoid ambiguity. For an English example,
consider the example of sentence, You may step for-
ward when your number is called. The implication is
that you may not step forward before your number is
called, for if that was not the intention, the sentence
You may step forward at any time could have been
used.
Such instances where listeners use higher-order rea-
soning to determine a meaning of an utterance beyond
what the utterance literally suggests were first studied
by Grice (1975), who called this process “conversa-
tional implicature.” In Grice’s theory, he put forward
the cooperative principle that supposed that speakers
adhered to a list of maxims – including, “Make your
contribution as informative as required” and “Be brief
(avoid unneccessary prolixity),” among many others
– and he argued that listeners will logically infer the
speaker’s true meaning by taking the speaker’s ad-
herence to these maxims as axioms. Grice’s maxims
were subsequently reformulated into a few more coher-
ent principles by numerous authors (Levinson (2000)
gives a nice summary). Our model suggests a sim-
pler alternative account of many instances of conver-
sational implicature: the speaker simply says as little
as possible to overcome the disagreement with the lis-
tener’s prior, trusting the listener to reason that any
other (unintended) likely meanings would have had
shorter expressions, e.g., as done by our second de-
coding scheme.
Other authors have noticed that conversational im-
plicature might arise from the desire to communicate
more efficiently—Sperber and Wilson (1995) in par-
ticular dwell on this point; conversely, many authors
also noticed that conversational implicatures might
be closely related to ambiguity, specifically that they
might exist for similar reasons and employ similar
mechanisms. Indeed, for all the bitter disagreements
that appear to exist between Sperber and Wilson and
Levinson (2000), they strongly agree on these points.
The difference in our work is that while on the one
hand we make no promises about being able to ac-
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count for vast ranges of phenomena like Levinson or
Sperber and Wilson do, on the other hand we show
that effects like conversational implicature can arise
from surprisingly minimial and uncontroversial con-
siderations. Indeed, our model is consistent with the
premises laid out by Sperber and Wilson prior to the
point where they begin speculating about cognitive ar-
chitectures, and is arguably “more obvious” (in hind-
sight) than the model they end up with.2
1.2 Interpretation and applications
Designing and recognizing the similarity between
nature and engineering informs our understanding of
both. Consider, for example, the striking similarity
between the camera and human eye. These similar-
ities suggest that certain aspects of the eye are not
artifacts of poor evolution, but instead may serve a
purpose. In the same way as connections between pho-
tography and human vision deepen our understanding,
we hope that robust compression schemes may help
connect information theory and the study of human
communication.
Second, there may be situations where two com-
puter systems need to communicate in a compressed
fashion, but they do not share exactly the same prior.
Consider, for example, a computer compressing a doc-
ument to be sent to a printers. Now, a fixed com-
pression scheme could be agreed upon in advance.
However, for compatibility reasons, this compression
scheme would remain fixed for many years, and it
may become poorly suited for a certain category of
documents that emerge years later. For example, if
many people started printing many documents with
the same fixed logo on it, the computers and printers
may adapt.
The idea here is that computers and printers could
learn and periodically update their priors based on the
documents they transmit, so that they may continue
to compress well under changing environment. The
following modification here may be useful. Suppose
there is a simple way to verify if the correct docu-
ment was reconstructed, which may be achieved by
a checksum or more elaborate mechanism. Then no-
2Although the model presented by Sperber and Wilson
(1995) is rather informal, the formalizations based on informa-
tion theory presented by, e.g., Blutner (1998), and formaliza-
tions based on game theory presented by, e.g., Parikh (1992),
Merin (1997), and van Rooy (2001) naturally end up being on
the one hand more intricate, but again, on the other hand are
intended to deal with a wider range of effects, and therefore
generally incomparable.
tice that the parameter α can be tuned adaptively:
communication with a smaller α may be attempted
first, and if that fails, a retry with a larger α may be
used, and so forth. Such a system would be adaptive
in the sense that, years down the road, any computer
and printer employing this protocol could communi-
cate succinctly, even if they had never previously en-
countered each other, with a logarithmic overhead in
terms of how different the documents they had seen
were. This type of copying nature for engineering pur-
poses has been recently popularized under the term
biomimicry.
1.3 Related work
In recent independent work, Piantadosi et al (2010)
justify ambiguity in natural language as we do by an
information-theoretic argument, but do not enter into
the realm of different priors. A similar technical ques-
tion about compressing with different priors, arises
in recent independent work by Braverman and Rao
(2010). The focus of their work is attaining optimal
bounds for reducing interactive communication com-
plexity, rather than modeling human communication.
A related notion, the quantity relative entropy, an-
swers the following question. When two parties com-
municate using a protocol designed for common prior
q, how long will messages be when the encoder actu-
ally chooses them from p? In this case, the encoder
must know q exactly, which is unrealistic in many set-
tings.
Universal compression schemes, such as the Lempel-
Ziv (1978) scheme, compress without knowledge or de-
pendence on a prior, so it is universal for all sources.
Asymptotically optimal compression is guaranteed for
ergodic sources, e.g., those generated by small state
Markov chain. However, any such prior-free encoding
will fail to take advantage of the rich shared knowledge
base that enables two parties to communicate a sig-
nificant amount of information in a short document or
even a single sentence. In short, existing compression
schemes, including Huffman, Lempel-Ziv, or algebraic
codes that we have not described, are clearly poorly
suited for human communication.
Other prior work has also explored communication
in the setting where the sender and receiver are some-
how different. For instance, Juba and Sudan (2008)
and Goldreich, Juba and Sudan (2009) considered how
interacting pairs may achieve certain goals that can be
achieved only by communication. Our work, while in-
spired by such work, is different in several aspects:
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It focusses on a different objective, namely to reduce
the number of bits used to communicate the message.
Also, we focus on the non-interactive setting, and the
quantitative bit-efficiency of our protocol is central to
our quest. Finally, our goal is to capture phenom-
ena that may explain some of the apparent artifacts
of natural language.
2 Formal model
There is a set of expressions which we denote by
X, and a set of meanings which we denote by M .
We assume that M is finite or countably infinite and,
for clarity, we take X = {0, 1}∗.3 A context provides
a probability distribution over meanings, and ∆(M)
denotes the set of probability distributions over M .
We assume that the encoding scheme and decod-
ing scheme may share a common parameter θ ∈ Θ,
chosen from some probability distribution µ. In our
schemes, this parameter corresponds to the afore-
mentioned bipartite graph. An encoder is a func-
tion, E : M × ∆(M) × Θ → X, written Eθ(m, p),
from meanings to expressions. Similarly, a decoder
D : X ×∆(M)×Θ→M , written Dθ(m, p), is a func-
tion from expressions and contexts to meanings. Note
that the parameter θ is chosen without regard to p or
q. When θ is clear from context, we will write E(m, p)
and D(x, q). A randomized compression scheme is a
sixtuple (X,M,Θ, E ,D, µ), where µ is a probability
distribution over Θ. Two probability distributions,
p, q ∈ ∆(M) are called α-close, for ambiguity parame-
ter α ≥ 1, if p(m) ≤ αq(m) and q(m) ≤ αp(m) for all
m ∈M .
Definition 1. A randomized compression scheme is
called α-robust if for any α-close pair, (p, q) and
any m ∈ M , Prθ∼µ[Dθ(Eθ(m, p), q) = m] = 1.
The entropy of the scheme (on p) is defined to be
Eθ∼µ,m∼p[|Eθ(m, p)|].
Note that it typically suffices to describe a decoding
procedure D(x, q) since the optimal matching com-
pression function E(m, p) simply selects the shortest
string x such that D(x, q) = m for all q that are α-
close to p. (Recall that the encoder is assumed to
know α in advance.)
3 Our compression scheme
In this compression scheme, we assume that the en-
3While we recognize that set of all finite binary strings is
clearly different than the richly-structured sets used in real lan-
guage, our choice of X will suffice to make our main points.
coder and decoder share a common infinite parame-
ter sequence 〈r(i)m 〉∞i=1, where r(i)m ∈ {0, 1}i for each
m ∈ M , chosen uniformly at random and indepen-
dently. In other words, for each message and each
length i = 1, 2, . . ., an independent random binary
string of length i is chosen and shared between the en-
coder and decoder.4 This determines a bipartite graph
between messages and {0, 1}∗ by connecting each mes-
sage m to r(i)m , for each i. As mentioned, this is similar
to a dictionary. In section 6, we give a more practical
scheme that requires a number of random bits that is
logarithmic in the number of messages.
On encoding x of length i = |x|, the decoder chooses
the most likely message m (that of greatest q(m))
among those messages such that r(i)m = x. Formally,
the scheme is as follows.
Compression scheme. The encoding algorithm
and decoding algorithm share randomness, namely in-
finite sequences of random strings θ = 〈r(i)m 〉∞i=1.
To encode m ∈M :
• Send r(i)m where i is the smallest natural number
such that: p(m) > α2p(m′) for all messages m′




To decode x ∈ {0, 1}∗:
• Let i = |x| and S = {m ∈M | r(i)m = x}. Output
argmaxm∈S q(m).6
Observation 1. For any α > 1, and uniformly ran-
dom r(i)m ∈ {0, 1}i, the compression scheme is α-
robust. For any p ∈ ∆(M), its entropy is at most
H(p) + 2 lg(α) + 2.
In the above, H(p) is the standard entropy of prob-
ability distribution p, defined by
∑
m p(m) lg 1/p(m).
Proof. The correctness of decoding follows from the
fact that for any α-close p and q, if p(m) > α2p(m′)
then q(m) ≥ p(m)/α > αp(m′) ≥ q(m′). With proba-
bility 1, there will be such an i that p(m) > α2p(m′)
for all messages m′ where r(i)m = r
(i)
m′ . So with proba-
4For simplicity, the algorithms are described using infinitely
many random bits. More practical versions are possible.
5In the (zero probability) event where there is no such num-
ber, send 0.
6To formally define D, we must define how the decoding
scheme behaves if there is not a unique maximum (or S = ∅).
In this case, we could designate a fixed message m0 and output
that message.
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bility 1, the message that was encoded is necessarily
the most likely m ∈ S for decoding.
It suffices to show that the expected encoding length
of a message m is at most lg(α2/p(m)) + 2. To see
this, note that there are less than α2/p(m) messages,
different from m, with probability at least p(m)/α2.
Call this set T and let s = |T | < α2/p(m). Consider
the probability that any other messagem′ ∈ T collides
with m on the i-bit encoding (r(i)m = r
(i)
m′). For i =
dlg(s)e + k, by the union bound, this probability is
at most s2−(lg(s)+k) ≤ 2−k. Using the fact that for
any nonnegative integer random variable V , E[V ] =∑∞
i=1 Pr[V ≥ i], we have that the expected number
of bits in common is at most dlg(s)e +∑∞k=0 2−k ≤
lg(s) + 2. ¤
It is not difficult to show that no α-robust scheme
can achieve entropy better than H(p) + lg(α) for all
p. On the other hand, we show below that there exist
distributions for which the entropy bound achieved by
our scheme is H(p)+(2−o(1)) lg(α) (i.e. our analysis
is essentially tight).
Claim 1. For any ε ∈ (0, 1), there exists a distribution
p and an α = α(ε) such that the entropy of the above
compression scheme is at least H(p) + (2− ε) lgα.
Proof. Fix k = d3/εe, and α = 2k2 . Now con-
sider a distribution p defined as follows: for each
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, the distribution p contains α2i mes-









= (k + 1) lgα+ lg k.
On the other hand, the entropy of the compression









(k + 1) lgα+2 lgα− 2 lgα
k
.
Since (2 lgα)/k + lg k ≤ ε lgα for our choice k and
α, the claim follows. ¤
An interesting question is if there is a compression
scheme that matches the H(p) + lg(α) bound.
4 The need for ambiguity
In this section, we show that any unambiguous com-
pression scheme requires many bits to communicate.
This holds even for nonrobust communication, i.e.,
for α=1. Formally, say an encoder is unambiguous
if for all θ ∈ Θ, m,m′ ∈ M , and p, p′ ∈ ∆(M),
if Eθ(m, p) = Eθ(m′, p′) then m = m′. Define the
dirac probability distribution δm by δm(m) = 1 and
δm(m′) = 0 for m′ 6= m.
Observation 2. For any unambiguous encoder on fi-
nite message set M , there is a message m such that
δm has expected entropy of lg
(|M |)− 1.
Hence, the trivial encoding scheme of encoding each
message by a unique length-lgM binary string, inde-
pendent of p, is essentially optimal even for probability
distributions δm, where H(δm) = 0.
Proof. Note that for any θ, the function f(m) =
Eθ(m, δm) is injective. Hence, by a standard counting
argument, for any fixed θ, Em∈UM [ |Eθ(m, δm)| ] ≥
lg
(|M |) − 1, where the expectation of is taken over
uniformly random m ∈M . Thus
Em∈UM,θ∼µ[ |Eθ(m, δm)| ] ≥ lg
(|M |)− 1.
Hence, there exists some message m such that
Eθ∼µ[ |Eθ(m, δm)| ] ≥ lg
(|M |)− 1, as is claimed. ¤
5 Higher-order disambiguation and
pruning the dictionary
If a message m has a unique encoding of length i,
then it seems unnecessary to disambiguate between
m and other messages on encodings of length greater
than i. This idea can be used to decrease the num-
ber of edges in the bipartite graph as well as average
number of bits communicated. Given parameter vec-
tor θ = 〈r(i)m 〉∞i=1, where r(i)m ∈ {0, 1}i for each m ∈M ,
we choose the following pruned vector θˆ = 〈rˆ(i)m 〉∞i=1,
constructed as follows. Define M1 =M and,
Mi+1 = {m ∈Mi | ∃m′ ∈Mi s.t. m′ 6= m
and r(i)m = r
(i)
m′}.
Mi are the set of messages that do not have a com-
pletely unambiguous encoding of length less than i.
Finally, for each m and i, set,
rˆ(i)m =
{
r(i)m if m ∈Mi
−1 otherwise.
In other words, a message which has a unambiguous
encoding of length i will be not have any encodings of
greater length.
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Observation 3. For any α > 1, our compression
scheme using rˆ instead of r is α-robust and has en-
tropy no greater than the entropy when using r. There
are probability distributions p for which it has strictly
lower entropy.
As can be seen from the proof below, “most” non-
trivial probability distributions will have strictly lower
entropy in the higher order scheme.
Proof. The proof of α-robustness is exactly the same
as in the first case. Clearly, the encoding of any mes-
sage cannot be longer than that of the second com-
pression scheme, if the two share the same random
strings. Finally, take three messages M = {a, b, c}
and p(a) = p(b) = p(c) = 1/3. With positive prob-









and r(2)c = 01. In this case, the compression scheme
encodes b by a string of length greater than 2 while
the higher-order scheme encode b by 00. ¤
6 Using fewer random bits
As stated, our compression scheme requires infi-
nite randomness, for finite message spaces, M . We
now give a variation with O(log(|M |)) random bits,
using Universal Hash Functions (Carter, and Weg-
man, 1979). Again, we do not change the compression
scheme but simply the dictionary, i.e., we apply the
compression scheme described earlier with a different
〈r(i)m 〉.
We assume w.l.o.g. that each message corresponds
to an `-bit string where ` = dlog(M + 1)e, that is,
m ∈ {0, 1}`. Let pi be any prime in the interval
[2`, 2`+1) (it exists by Bertrand’s postulate). The lan-
guage will have a pair a, b of random parameters where
a ∈ {1, 2, . . . , pi − 1}, and b ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , pi − 1}. We







(mod 2i) if i ≤ `
m if i = `+ 1
−1 if i > `+ 1
Observation 4. Let a ∈ {1, 2, . . . , pi − 1} and b ∈
{0, 1, 2, . . . , pi − 1} be chosen uniformly at random.
Then the compression scheme with r as defined above
is α-robust and, for any p ∈ ∆(M), has expected en-
tropy H(p) + 2 lgα+ 2.
Proof. By construction, every message has a different
r
(`+1)
m , hence no message will require more than `+ 1
bits to encode and the protocol is α-robust. It suf-
fices to show that the expected encoding length of a
message m is at most lg(α2/p(m)) + 2.
To see this, again note that there are less than
α2/p(m) messages, different from m, that have prob-
ability at least p(m)/α2. Call this set T and let
s = |T | < α2/p(m). Notice that a fixed m′ ∈ T
collides with m on the i-bit encoding, when r(i)m = r
(i)
m′
which happens iff (am + b) (mod pi) and (am′ + b)
(mod pi) agree on the last i bits. So the collisions
are correlated, and in particular any two messages
will collide on r(i)m for i = 1, 2, . . . , up to the num-
ber of trailing bits that they agree on. A simple and
standard argument shows that for any pair of dis-
tinct messages m,m′, as a ranges over {1, 2, . . . , pi−1}
and b ranges over {0, 1, 2, . . . , pi − 1}, we have (i)
(am + b) (mod pi) 6= (am′ + b) (mod pi), and (ii)
((am+ b) (mod pi), (am′ + b) (mod pi)) range over all
possible pi(pi − 1) pairs of values. Thus over ran-
dom choice of a, b, for any i ≤ ` + 1, we have that
Pr[r(i)m = r
(i)
m′ ] ≤ 2−i. Hence for i = dlg(s)e + k, by
the union bound, the probability that any message in




2−k. As before, using the fact that for any nonneg-
ative integer random variable V ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ` + 1},
E[V ] =
∑`+1
i=1 Pr[V ≥ i], we have that the expected
encoding length is at most dlg(s)e +∑`k=0(2−k) ≤
lg(s) + 2. ¤
Thus O(log |M |) random bits suffice.
7 Conclusions
We have shown that ambiguity is necessary for com-
pression, and that a natural variation on Shannon-
type of communication leads to robust compression
schemes that are more similar to how humans com-
municate. The case of α = 1 corresponds to classical
compression with a common prior. In this case, for
Shannon’s fundamental question of how many bits are
required to compress a message from a single distri-
bution, the beautiful answer is Huffman coding (Huff-
man, 1952). However Huffman coding is not robust
to different priors. It is not even clear what metric
should be used to judge optimality with respect to
robust compression.
Second, our model is unrealistic in many ways. For
example, the encoder must choose a single α and is
required to be precise to all α-close priors. In some
cases, an encoder may consider some misinterpreta-
tions to be more “costly” than others, i.e., there may
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be a cost function c : M × M → R+ (c(m,m′) is
the cost of interpreting message m to be m′, and
c(m,m) = 0), and an encoder choosing amongst ambi-
guities may wish to avoid certain mistakes. For exam-
ple, the sentence, he is a tireless student and brilliant
researcher, could potentially mean he is a tireless stu-
dent, and he is a great researcher or he is a tireless
student, and he is a tireless great researcher, but a
confusion would not be serious. On the other hand,
the sentence, you would be lucky to get him to work
for you is ambiguous and the difference in meaning is
very important.
Finally, we have not considered computational ef-
ficiency. Day to day, it does not seem that com-
putational limitations are the cause of most failures
to communicate. However, there are some sentences
that are notoriously difficult to parse, called garden
path sentences, such as the classic sentence, The horse
raced past the barn fell. Similarly, riddles are com-
putationally challenging to solve. It would be very
interesting to design computationally-efficient robust
compression schemes.
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